Accountingscandalsarebecomingperpetualinnature.TheyrangefromtheancientMesopotamia,totheSouthSeaBubbleof1720,tothefamousEnronof2001,downtoParmalat,Tesco,andToshibaoftoday.Theseriesofaccountingscandalsthathaveoccurredinthelasttwodecadescallsforagreaterconcernbytheaccountingprofession.Theaccountingscandalsthathaveoccurredinthis21stcenturyalonehaveshownthatthereisaneedtolookbeyondcorporategovernanceinthefightagainstfinancialdeception.Inthispaper,wearguethateveninthefaceoftheSarbanes-OxleyAct(SOA)of2002andotherregulationsaroundtheworldthataretargetedtowardseffectivecorporategovernance,accountingscandalshaveneverceasedtooccur.Mostofthelegislationsthathavebeenpassedinrecenttimesweretargetedatcorporategovernance,forgettingthecrucialrolethatauditplayswithintheagencyrelationship.Andwheneverthereisanyrevelationoffraudulentfinancialreporting,investorsdonotaskwhoarethedirectors,butthefirstquestiontheyaskiswhoaretheauditors?Hence,thereisaneedtoimproveauditqualitybyapproachingitfromaforensicaccountingperspectiveinordertoreducetheincidenceoffinancialstatementfraudsinthiseraofinformationrevolution,thusrestoringinvestors’confidencebackinthefinancialreportingprocessandcorporategovernance.Inthispaper,weproposeaforensicaccountingparadigmasaviableoptionforreducingaccountingscandals,sincethiswillcomplimentcorporategovernancesystems.
